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II If -Wir andern morgen, wir andern heut, 
Wir indern wutend und erfreut, 
Wir andern, ohne zu v_ersagen 
an allen sieben Wochentagen. 
II 
Wir andern teils aus purer Lust, 
Mit-~orsatz teils, teils unbewusst. 
Wir aodern gut und auch bedingt 
Weil Andern i111ner Arbeit bringt. 
-- "Gesang der B11dungspolitiker0 
For more thari a decade, academic institutions have been under fire~ .Unlike 
the Phoenix, however, the principle of university antonoQ\Y has not emerged un-
scathed fram the ashes of what has been labeled a "revolution in the relation-
ship of law and social po·l icy 11(Kirp and Yudof, 1974}. As institutions of higher 
learning become all the more dependent upon public financing througho1Jt .~dvan,e,ecl ____ -...,..-- .. 
industrial nations, they are steadily being ·pulled into their respective,,central 
political-legal systems. De~isions bearing on the. administration as well· as on 
the substance of higher education have became the domain of state legislators, 
the federal bureaucracies and lately of the courts. 
< ' , -
Growing fiscal constraints and concerns over deficit spending at the na-
tional level have given rise -to the rhetoric of New Federalism in the USA. 
Similarly, questions regarding the allocation of ever scarcer resources and the 
redistribution of fiscal responsibil_ities have also served to modify the char-
acter of federalism as practiced in West Germany. This paper explores the 
changing nature of "cultural federa1ismu by tracing the evolution of the 1976 
German Federal.Framework Law for Higher Education. lt demonstrates the extent 
to which the protracted academic refonn process turned Gennan universities into 
a battlefield for competing socio-political factions at the federal and state 
levels. Gqvernment financing of highereducational expansion programs, in par-
ticular, was to become the most critical aspect of university administration 
and, consequently, a major source of constitutional conflict between the ·Bund 
and the Lander. The univers1tyf1nanca.1ssue led to a more extensive debate 
' 
over areas of concurrent Jurisdiction and structural refonn, resulting in a 
number of amendments to the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) itself.· Crosscutting cleav-
ages between the SPD and COU factions, politicians and bu"aucrats, national and . 
state-level policy makers eventually found expression in the 1976 Federal 
Framework Law, but only after the Constitutional Court stepped in for the pur-
. pose of creating a "temporary• pa11tfca1 consensus. 
The paper begins with :a definition of the concept .of cultural feder-alism-
and its relation to the higher educational policy process in the FRG. It then 
provides a genera.1 history of the reform process, arguing that changes within 
the German institutions of higher learning over the last ten years have, for 
the most part, have been externally inducad. The reform proc:sss is treated in 
three phases, "expansion, a 11standardization11 and "rationalization; II each cor-. 
. . . 
responding to maned shifts . in academic reform objectives. Th~- pa~er _then ·con--~-=- -I 
centrates an the 1nter,1ay of various parliamentary .developments- anci concludes~°'-- . .,.-~? 
with a swmnary of reform ac::cmplistmtents to date. 
A. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL FEDERALISM 
As a safeguard against l"eCUrrent· or possible futura abuses of cantralized . 
control, the 11 provis1ona1 11 const1tut1on (Grund9eset%) promulgated i_n 1949 pla~ea~""-.;c-::c::• 
strong 1imitat10·ns on· the exercise of federal· powers in the FRG. Article 20 of 
the Basic Law UJtderHned the democratic and 11s0c:'fal-federal 11 character of the 
new Gennan state, guaranteeing popular sovereignity,_ separation of powers and - · -- -=--== 
. . . . . . - r II . -
the right to resistance. Article 28 moreover obliged the Lander governments to 
, . - . . . , , l 
comply in pM>tecting the basic freedoms ascribed· ta the federa.1 order. Article _ 
30 nonetheless made provision for the exercise cf states' rights, holding that -
the discharge of government functions was incimbent upon the Lander unless other-
wise presCT"ibed by the Basic Law. · In such cases, federal law was to override 
Land 1 aw, according to Arti c 1 e 31 ~~. 
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The promulgation of the Lander• constitutions shortly after national rati-
fication of the Grundgesetz in May, 1949 demonstrated how seriously the states 
conmitted themselve~ to the strict division of labor foreseen in the cultural-
educational arena. The Lander ~tatutes; moreover testified to starkly contrast-
ing cultural differences and educational principles: 
When for instance Bavaria (Art. 131, Section 2) and other states 
have placed the fear of God,. Hessen the development of the ·moral 
personality (Art. 56, Section 4). Bremen the inculcation of a ·. 
sense of community (Art. 26, Section 1), or Hamburg the prepara-
tion for life's contingencies at the beginning of their respective 
catalogues of educational tasks and objectives, this means that 
there are already principally different premises upon which their 
school systems rest (Faulstich, 1977, pp. 150-151}. 
. . . 
State sovereignty in the cultural and educational domains (Kulturhoheit) 
covered a broad.range of activities in a variety of educational facilities: 
- legislation anaadministration for the. entire elementary and 
vocational school system,· as well as ·for the technical and 
engineering schools; 
- detennination and regulation of the budgetary process for post-
secondary education·and training; 
- and the provision of state subsidies for theaters, musewns and 
libraries, in addition to all facilities involved in adult edu-
cation (Frey, 1961, p. 196). 
States were to. fulfi11 these tasks "as their own responsibility;" under· no 
circumstances was the national government to asswne primary responsibility for 
these areas. The preparation of God-fearing, conmunity-minded or life-adjusted 
citizens under the auspices of individual state educational ministers was con-
ducted without special !ttention ~ potential, over-arching political-economic 
constraints. 
The concept of federalism outlined in the Basic L~w had an instrumental char-
acter: its aim was to promote the political liberalization of an historically 
authoritarian decision-making structure. ·A few areas of concurrent jurisdic-
tion were introduced to ensure competition between the two levels of govern-
. . ( . . 
ment as part of a new "checks and balances" system. Subsequent efforts to re-.. 
fonn the Gennan university system illustrate the extent to which these very 
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const1tutional provisions resulted in a. petrification of federal-s'Qte inter-
actions. rather than in a l1bera11zat1on af these relations. For the Lander, 
the maintenance of the existing federal division of labor became an end in it-
self,· rather than the means for securing substantive educational rights •. 
· In -ret1"ospec:t, the limitations inherent 1n 11cultural federalism11 contri-
buted ta, but did· not single-handedly cause the ~•university problem 11 that was · 
to plague German policy makers h-cm the 19601 s 1JP through the 19801s. Substan-
tive conflic~ of interests have extended or intensified those inherent in fed-
eral state relations~ As Wolf-Dieter Fuhr1g observes. 
Cultural autonomy has been a symbol of federalism, but not.~ contri-
bution to pragmatic democracy. Just·as academic fnedan has become a 
shibboleth for the protection of the academic establishment,· so cul~ 
tural autanamy has turned fnto a shibboleth for the professional and 
political interests which stand to lose from a centralized management 
of the country's cultural institutions. The most inf1uent1al people 
thus affected are the thousands of politicians and bureaucrats who . 
a.,e their livelihood and status to the existence of the states (Fuhr1g, ~, 
~I 1966, pp. 187-188). · 
... ,, .... --~~~=-! 
B. · TIIE S£1TING: "HIGH TIME" FOR. EDUCATIONAL REFORM ·. 
Because of its status as an advancad industrial socie~, the Gerrnan F9den1 
Republic C?Uld be tttought to share many of the goals of i:ts Western neighbors. 
Yet in a C0111Par'fson of educational reforms among European Comnuniey nations 
within the last two decades, the FRG clearly lagged behind. In 1965, Torsten 
Huse'nmaintained that the West.Gennan·educational system served as ~a present 
day European exampte•of a failure ta plan (Heidenhe1mer, et al., 1975,.p. 51). 
The ileducat1ona1 catastrophe, 11 first explored in depth by Georg. Picht· in 1964~ -~ ,.~...,, 
was particularly visible at the tertiaJ"J level. Academic institutions continued 
to be dominated by the kinds of hierarchical stl"Uctures and authoritarian teach-
. ing methods that had characterized German education prior ta 1939. Refonns in 
the areas of curricula revision, teacher -training programs, university g~ver-
nance and admissions policies were. long overdue. Further, despite the post-war 
carmitment to mere democratic fcnns of socio-political organization, the number 
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of students from working class families admitted to the universities remained 
at the level of five to ten percent -- even though enrollments had inore than 
doubled by 1965 (Picht, 1965). 
Picht demanded that education be made the nation's number one domestic 
priority for pedagogical ·as well as for.social and economic reasons. First, 
. . 
he warned that ·an extreme shortage of teachers and classroom facilities was in-
evitable, in light of the additional two million children about to descend upon 
the country•s elementary schools -- the first wave of the post-war Baby Boom; 
obviously the quality of education would be seriously impaired if existing per-
sonnel and classroom space were only to be maintained at existing levels. Sec-
ondly, Picht pointed to significant imbalances at the L&nder level, owing to 
the decentralized administration of education; school children in provincial-
agricultural regions in particular were not able to meet even the comparatively 
low-level national standards, and family transfers from state to state disad-
' vantaged elenentary-aged_pupils more than their elders. Thirdly, Picht projected 
the end of the Wirtschaftswunder. In an age of technology and specialization, 
an educational system based on 19th century philosophical principles posed a 
threat to the economic health of society as a whole. Entrance into the Coman 
Market and increasing international competition required the 11 productioil11 of 
ever greater numbers of skilled laborers, which would hike the price (and the 
value) of education at all levels. The primary f1nancer in Gennany has always 
been-the.State; but public investment in education had, in fact. decreased 
- from 3.31 percent of the national budget in 1958 to 3.26 percent in 1960 and 
2.9 percent in 1962 {Picht, 1965, p. 10). P1cht placed the blame on the fonn 
of cultura_l-educational administration: the Lander exercised complete control 
. over 1 egislation and ·administration, while· planning and financing powers not. 
. . 
specifically delegated in the Basic Law were coveted by authorities· at the 
nati ona 1 1 eve l. 
In 1965, sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf underscored Picht's analysis of 
.J . l 
imi,ending doom. Then he 1ntroducad another critical variable which was ta be-
CClne the bane of university existence, m. the notion that B11dung .1st 
Biltgerrecht - education, in the la1"9er sense, is a civ11 right (Dahrendorl, 
1968). Oahrendorf emphasized that educational refonn was not only crucial in 
regard to the nation's future economic and scientific demands, but also in 
light of changing social needs. Aff1uence, he argued, was only one dimension 
of fnedcm in a democntic: society. · Article' 12/1 of the Grundgesetz (the •Basic 
Law" se"ing as the pn:,visional constitution) guaranteed a11 citizens the right 
to choose 'freely their vocations. educational fac111t1es and places of work, 
as did respective articles in the Under statutes. The State had no alternative 
but to make Chancengleichheit - equal opportunity - the basis of subsequent -
educational refonns. 
C.; CONSTrruTIONAL CHANG£ . AND . EDUCATIONAL .· CENTRALIZATION . _ __ -"-/ 
The Basic Law not only ccmnitted the Federal Republic to particular dis:··--- -:-:.~ 
tributions of pol 1t1ca1 power.· The provisional cgnst1tut1on also 1111120sed a 
.. , 
fairly rigid division of fiscal responsibilities. Furthennore. the German can- · 
st1tut1on rendered the 1101"9anizat1on of the Federation into statas11 and "the 
bas1c cooperation of the states in legislat10n11 {thrcugh the Bundesrat) un-
amendable, according to Article 79/3. As the .afterglow of ·unprecedentad eca-
. nomic reconstruction began ta fade, financa was to become the mast critical 
1 , : ' • • • 
aspect of university administration, and cgnsequently, the major source of 
constitutional ccnf1ict between the. Bumi and the Linder towards .the late 
· sixties. 
Although the Grundaesetz specif1ca11y designates education as a policy 
: . . . . . n 
area over which the individual Lander are to exercise exclusive control, t-Mo 
. . -
·. Articles arig1na11y contained 1n the Basic Law potentially recognize the need 
for joint state.:federal action 1n the.educational field. ThecataJogueof 
responsibilities in Article 74 presumes 
- ---------:-= 
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concurrent legislative powers shall extend to the following 
matters: ••• · 
. (13) the regulation of educational and training grants 
. and the promotion of scientific research. 
Article 75 further provides, 
(1) the Federation shall have the right to enact 
.skeleton provisions concerning: ••• 
(la) the general principles governing higher educa-
tion; ••• 
Moreover, an amendment introduced ·by the reform-minded Brandt government in 
1969 effected rather .significant changes in Bund-Llnder relations. According 
to Article 91a, 
(1) The Federation shall participate in the
0
discharge of 
the following responsibilities of the Lander ••• : 
1. expansion and construction of institutions of 
higher education including university clinics. 
And Article 91b holds, 
The Federation and the Linder.may pursuant to agreements cooperate 
in educatfonal planning and in the promotion of institutions and 
projects of scientific research of·supra-regional importance. The 
apportionment of costs shall be regulated in· the pertinent agree-
ments.· · 
Hence, Articles 91a and b foresaw the development of joint tasks or pro-
grams (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben), as a means of circumventing the restrictions of 
the f edera 1 budgetary process and avoiding juri sdi cti.ona l c 1 ashes. The amend-
ments authorized the Bund's participation in Lander responsibility for educa-
tional planning, on the basis of shared financing for educational experiments 
•(such as Baden-Wi.irttemberg's proposed Gesamthochschule, finally .constructed 
in Hessen instead, where political conditions proved mo>re favorable). 
One side predictably chose to. interpret the statutes more broadly.than 
the other •. For educational planners, 
· the decisive question /waef whether the executive heads of state 
/couli[ be compelled on the basis of BL~resolutions to include 
the requisite fiscal items in their legal-budgetary .Proposals, as 
intended by §10 of the Law for the Promotion of University Con-
struction (Hbfg) (Staff, 1973, p. 727) • 
. *The Bynd- Lander Komnission is the Joint Federal-State Commission for Educa-
tional Planning and the.Promotion of Research, created in 1970. 
-a-
For Lander authorities, the issue wu· strictly a question of voluntary ccm-
pliancs. 
Interpretation and implementation of the amendments drew attention .to 
·, another dimension of the federal checks and balances system. Final approval 
of the national budget 1n the FRG rested with the Parliament (cf. Art. 14, 15, 
59/2, Art. 105 - 115)~ Swept away by a sense of •planning euphoria• during 
the early years of the Brandt govefflllent, the Federal Chance11or's Offica (FCO) 
became so enthra11ed with the possibilities affol"ded by the American PPBS in-
vention, that it forgot to mind its manners with respect to the dictates of 
demacratic pluralism. The •happy planners• in the FCO were by and large Social 
Democratic political appointees, little constrained by the short-teni electoral 
interests of the parliamentarians. For their part, the legislators had neither 
the necessary accsss to spectalized 1nfonnation, not flexible, alternative de- _ j 
cision-makin~ pracsdures at their disposal. Nonetheless, 11plann-jng~ as- art ex!"'-e_ ,,>.,,, 
ecutive function cculd not be divorced f1"0111 the Political processes of goal- . 
. setting, l~islating and budgeting (Zeh, l97~). S1aw1y but sunly, a11 sides 
came to realize that, 
· insofar as the refonn of the •c0nfederation11 [was] concarned, not 
only jwasj a new regulation of the joint programs imperative, but 
also the introduction of cnnstitutiona1 reform in the area of fi-
nance. And in order to canbat the danger of dis pl acenent, a. con-· -
tinuation: of whole-scale, aovermnent organizational reform f&ecameJ 
essential,· to prevent the removal of preliminary planning decisions 
from the hands of pol1t1cal1y acccuntable. state officials by inde-
·pendent or semi-autonomous advisory -and planning organs. (Karpen, 1977, 
pp. 268-269). 
- . . . 
Seeking to expand its own role in the planning process, the Gentian lower 
house (Bundestag) established the Tn>eger Comnission in 1966, while the Interior 
Minist~ set up a "Project Group -for Governmental and Administrative Refonn11 
in 1968. Expanding on. this fonn, the Commission of Inquiry for Constitutional 
Refonn (Enauette Kommission Veriassunasrefonn • El<V), constituted by Bundestag . - - " 
- decree in October, 1970,. was to concentrate on multiple, complex issues: 1'gov- · 
ernabi1ity3 (Regierbarkeit), Rtl"ans~arency• of decision-making, democnticization 
i 
-9-
and expanded participation opportunities for citizen interest groups; the con-
stitutional and legal limits involved in the planning process; development of 
a federal framework for mid-range as well as long-tenn task and finance planning 
(Aufgaben- und Finanzplanung). Following the publication of its preliminary re-
port in September, 1972, the EKV was harshly criticized for its adherence to_ 
rational-actor fantasies in the face of obvious political differences. The 
Planning Department in the FCO had disintegrated (self-destructed, one could 
argue} for_ very similar reasons in 1972 (Mushaben, 1977). The federal executive 
succeeded in_ introducing a degree of "negative coordination11 among the initiators 
of joint programs at best. The t11inisterial bureaucracy returned to incremental 
methods and "business as usual" after this very brief stint with long-tenn, com-
prehensive political planning (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975, p. 147). 
Reconstituted by the Parliament in May, 1973, the -Enguette Komnission was 
pennitted to continue with its deliberations until it produced its final report 
in December~ 1976. Members of the Bundestag and the Linder Commissions agreed 
that the joint programs.had produced a 11mish-mash 11 of administrative and finan-
-cial operations which, in effect, reduced political accountability and the degree 
of administrative transparency on either side. Together they recommended the 
refonnulation of Articles 74 through 77 and the replacement of Articles 91a, 
91b and 104a/4 with new Articles 28a and 104b (designating "framework planning" 
and "investment aid" as areas of concurrent jurisdiction, and guaranteeing the 
Sund finance rights in post-secondary educational matters). None,of these 
. . . 
amendments came to pass, but one of the unintended outcomes of the Final Report 
. - . ,-
was nevertheless the assignment of a comnittee within- the Federal Education and 
Science Ministry (BMBW) to study in greater detail "the structural problems of 
the federative educational system." 
- The federal executive reluctantly revealed the findings of its much con-
. . . 
tested investigatory report in light of mounting public and media pressure in 
February, 1978; its reasons for wanting to suppress its conclusions are not 
inmediately_ clear. The BMBW argued that the national failure to achieve effec-
tive standardization of higher 1earning practices and greater educational oppor-
tunitY awed largely to state limitations on structural innovation: the problen 
. . . - " 
with "cooperat1ve11 cultural federalism was that the Lander wouldr, 1 t cooperate. 
according to sunmary findings. The KMK* was quick to respond with a 51-page ref-
utation of the nstnic:tural Report" at its Aprfl,1978 plena?"J session. The Con-
ferenc:a of Educatfon Ministers ccmplained that. of the 34 constitutional altera-
tions supported ,by -the Parliament between 1949 - 1978. 29 had worked to the det-
riment of the states. The plenum held that the Report was one more elenent in _ 
the Bund's constitutional power play which f'a11ed tD take Lander-specific: needs 
and capabi1 ities into acccunt. The ministers contended that positive inroads 
. - n 
had been made, particularly at the elenentary level, and that the Sund-Lander 
Konnrfssion already provided the necessary forum for cooperative educational 
planning. 
In- this writer's estimation, the EK'l's Final Rl!$>0rt, the cantral gcvern- -
ment's 1970 11Educational Reportu (Bildunqsbendtt 1970) and the BMBW's 11Struc-
tural Report• reveal more about developments in the general political environ-
ment than they do about the progress of university reform ]!,r..§_e. What prompted_ 
Lander acquiescence 1n 1969 when Parliament saw fit to adopt two very important-,-'~--,, 
amendments. Articles 91a and 9lb? , Why was the Structural Report viewed as a 
power-play tactic, rather than as an attenl)t to introduce more effective manage-
ment of federal funding? Briefly, the 1969 provisions authorizing joint pro-
. grams were part of a larger domestic refann · package offered by Brandt._· Hence, 
the states consented to Article 91b 1n exchange for Arti.cle· 91a, which provided . 
federal assistance for _improvements in regional economic structures, development 
of the agrarian seetors · and preservation of coastal regions (Der Spiegel, No. 
10/1969, No. 18/1969). Fe<ieral legisiation concerning academics require<i the 
consent of the Bundesrat. ccmposed of the state government lea~ers; .economic _ 
problems in these other areas were too important for the states to disregard. 
*The Kultusministerkcnfemz is the Standing Conferenca of Stattt Educational 
Ministers. 
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so· the Lander stuck in their thumbs and pulled. what they thought were plums 
out of the federal pie, assuming that their Bundesrat representatives in Bonn 
would watch over the ingredients. When the Federal Finance Mininstry started 
to supervise more of·the shopping to counteract inflationary developments, the 
Lander found their portions significantly pruned instead. Also important are 
. the electoral shifts in party strength that occurred between .1970 and 1972, 
which jeopardized the Bundesrat's ability to prevail over decisions of the 
Bundestag. 
Article 75 tipped the balance, in essence, replacing the notion of con-
current jurisdiction with "framework" powers for the Sund (Von Schenck, 1976, 
p. 34). By this point the Linder were forced to direct a good part of their 
energies inward, intent on waging war against student radicalism and academic 
politicization. When they focused their attention on Bonn once again, the 
Bund had made critical jurisdictional advances, supported by the 1972 Federal· 
,Constitutional Court ruling on the Numerus Clausus system. So it was that cer-
tain constitutional amendments _came _to pass, and the. national government 
equipped itself with broad framework powers which still required supplementary 
state legislative and administrative action. 
Iri sunmary, centralization efforts, instead of simplifying a transfer of 
. : - II / ,-
academic responsibility from the Lander to the Sund, opened a new Pandora's 
. box filled with complex, conflict-ridden questions· of budgetary and _broader 
, , , 
constitutional reform. Federal officials continued to look to structural re-
fonn to cure the educational system of demographic and institutional ills, 
while the states assiduouslydevised new strategies of resistance. It should 
be clear to the reader that many complicat$d issues were involved, all of 
which were brought to bear on university ref~rm processes, but few having had 




O. -REFORM IN THREE PHASES AND THE GENESIS OF THE F£DERAL FRAMEWORK LAW 
· Under the c:ircumstancas, exoansion of the tertiary sector was a 1ogica1 
f1l'"St choica in the search _far refonn alternatives, ·beginning in °1965. Re- . 
cuperating fl"0ffl the radical reductions of 1933-1939, university enrollments re- · 
. - I 
turned to nonnal levels by 1952; stabilization was .short-lived, however. In-
stitutions of higher learning experienced a 76 percent increase be'bteen 1952 _ 
and 1960, and a further enrollment rise of.100 percent during -the per1or 1960-
1970. But the real 11educational explosiona would occur between 1970 and 1975: 
the number oi' students was to skyroda!t an additional 180 percent (W1ssen-
schaftsn~ 1976, pp. 9-12). 
Phase l, 1965 to 1970, saw educational authorities adopt a variety. of ex-
pansion strategies, beginning with the creation of eighteen new higher educa-
tional institutions. 0ff1c:1alsfurther attacked. the spac:a problem by expand-
ing the existing universities; by tnnsfarming special 1 zed institutes into . _,_I 
•regula~ universities; by adding requ1Nments and then accredft1"9- technical_...:~,:~= 
schools with higher educatio-nal status·; by shifting labs and· institutes, as - · 
well as other support structures· to permit better. ut11izatian of available 
spaces. The next step was to swell the ro11s of the academic· teaching staff, 
adding a ne,- stratum of junior faculty (Mittelbau) in order ta restore studen,~- __ _ 
. - .~~~~~ 
teacher ratios to the nonnal levels of the l950's. In fact, the ranks ex-
panded from 9,000 Nassistantsn 1n 1960, ta 18,000 in 1965, to 28,000 by 1971 
(~rund- und Strukturdatan, 1977. · p. 96). 
_· These expansion measures produced two unintended results: l) the increased 
. . 
. supply actually exacerbated the danand for university education in the midst_ of 
the baby boom; and 2) rapid institutional gl"OWth precipitated internal crises . 
of coordination and authority. Federal exp_enditures to higher education had 
·_ increased by 500 percent, while_ control over the allocation of these monies re-
mained constitutiona11y vested in the Lander. In order for the Sund ta s.ucceed 
- -
1n effectively distributing subsidies ta the Lander and ta ensure their -use for 
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expansion purposes, federal authorities held that it was necessary to simplify· 
their dealings with the respective recipients •. The mode of university admin-
istration differed significantly from.state to state, and coordination depended 
upon voluntary compliance by the Lander. 
Phase !!,"extending from 1968 to 1972, was characterized by a more active 
attempt on the part of state officials at both levels to direct pressing intra-
organizational and interinstitutional refonns. Standardization was a strategy 
intended to aid the national executive in concentrating and managing its "new 
assistance re1ationships, 11 whi1e bringing a broad range of conflicting state 
educational priorities more clearly into line with each other and with national 
SPD reform orientations.(especially after 1969). The Linder viewed standard-
ization as an opportunity for dictating structural reforms (replacing traditional 
"Faculties" with departments), and streamlining university admissions and gover-
nance procedures (.switching .to a presidential-management system). -Authori-ties ·· 
moreover became conscious of the need to agree on more unified academic pro-
grams to facilitate student transfers ac?"oss statelines to less crowded univer-
sities (Mushaben, 1981). 
Overcrowding 1 n fact became the major prob 1 em by 1972, m.aki ng it necess_ary ~-
for individual universities to impose numerical limitations on student admis-
sions. Enrollment projections issued by the new Federal Education Ministry of 
280,000 for 1978 and 560,000 for 1980 had been surpassed by 1960 registrations 
(291,000) and 1971 figures (587,400), respectively.· (Rahmenplan, 1978, p. 15). 
On October 20, 1972, the eleven Lander ministers institutionalized the Numerus 
clausus system by creating a Central Office for Student Admissions .in Dortmund. 
The Numerus clausus principle applied especially to those seeking to enroll in 
architecture, biology, chemistry, dentistry; medicine, phannacy, psychology and 
the veterinary sciences. 
Face to face with the brooding giant of finite fiscal resources that was 
conjured up by the recession of 1971~72 and the inflationary effects of the 
1972-73 energy crisis, the Federal Finance Ministr'J brought university expansion 
programs to a dramatic halt. Owing to fiscal constraints, educational author- . 
1t1es were forced tc pursul! a strategy of rationalization, between 1972 and 
1976. · The objective of. this particular reform exercise was to produce ID.2!:!; 
graduates with higher qualifications in l!!!. time at lower ,S2!1 to concerned 
German taxpayers. The Linder ministers of education took advantage of the brake 
on national expansion measures ta extend their powers with respect to the regu-
lation of examinations, and with thats ta intensify .their involvement in the 
currfcular reform process. Steps to streamline am-icula and the. imposition 
of tougher exam requirements were intended ta •depo11t1c1ze• the academic en-
v1ronnent, as we11 as ta discipline individual university activists. 
By the end of the 1960 • s, finance had become the mast cr1 tf ca 1 aspect of 
university administnt1on and, consequently, a ma.jar source of constitutional 
conflict between the Bu'1d and the Lander. Amendment 91b led to a number of -1 
parliamentary acts dealing w1 th un1vers1t.Y canstl'Uction and federal budgetary c-~'"'I 
. procedures, which• 1n turn were to lay groundwork for a National Higher Education 
Act.·. Federal Educational Minister Leussink presented the first 1eg1slat1ve 
draft to parliament in 1971;· but by 1972, political winds had begun to shift. 
While the SPO consolidated its majority in the Bundestag fallowing the 1972 
national elections, state-level elections produced a CDU-dcminated Bundesrat, 
that was nady, willing and able to exercise a suspensive veto against three 
subsequent drafts of the Framework Law. It gees without saying that the Gennan 
' . . . . . c:;..·;..:-~·-=--
university was·a house divided, owing to the disruptive effects of the anti-
I . . . •. . . II ·. .. . . • . . 
Vi~etnani prcwts and the student movement. Bund and Lander authorities carried 
tne,r political differences and jurisdictional disputes into the ha11s of par-
1 . 
liament, each hoping to play the role of 11 the state to the rescue. 11 
The image of "the state to the rescue11 meant that government· agencies could 
· skirt the (ccnst1tutiona1) issue of "academic freedcm 11 and legitimate their 0\tln 
efforts to instigate refonns at the 11 cooperative11 federal level, in light of 
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· the broa~er framework powers contained in Article 75a and 91b. The new powers 
resulted in new problems for federal policy-makers, however, and new impediments 
to further refonn efforts were by and large of .a party-political nature. Par-
liamentary initiat1ves geared toward legislating the process of higher educa-
tional refonn were hindered by tensions at four levels: 1) at the federa.l fi-
nance level; 2) at the lev.el of Sund-Lander relations; 3) at the party level, 
between. the SPO government and the CDU/CSU opposition forces; and 4) at the 
political-administrative level, between politicians, planners and bureaucrats. 
1) By the time the BMBW presented Parliament with the first draft of a 
Framework Law.in 1970-71, the FRG had already experienced one.minor and one 
major recession. The sense of 11planning euphoria" which had arrived with Brandt 
at the FCO was soon dispelled by the brooding giant, and. its henchman, the Fed~ 
~I 
eral Finance Ministry. In Gennany, as elsewhere, the Treasury enjoyed multiple l 
.... ·--· --;·,::--=~ 
opportunities for intervention and control, and grew ever more reluctant to . 
part with the resources at its disposal, in view of the general economic slow-
down. Brandt's preoccupation with Ostpolitik left little time.for convincing re-· 
. . 
ca1citrant.Cabinet·members of the need for expensive educational experiments. 
2) Jurisdictional disputes in matters of financing, legislation and ad-
ministration were complex enough, indicating that Article 91b had not proved 
as effective in resolving Sund-Lander conflicts as had been hoped. Even more 
problematic, however, was the heretofore unconsidered process of middle-range 
and long-range finance pi°anning. Efforts to establish a centr_al ized planning 
. - . II - . 
system in the Chancellor's· Office collapsed by 1972. - Yet the Lander had neither 
. the personnel resources nor the infonnational overview necessary for coordinated· 
planning systems .of their own -- the result was a functional vacuum. The in-, 
troduction of the Central Admissions Office in Dortmund in 1972, intended to 
match up an overflow of student applications with an undersupply of university 
places, only increased the strains on intergovernmental relations (since most 
II . 
of the Lander were bent on saving places for the J_andeskinder, e.g. Bavaria). 
•l;g-
This and other stop.gap measures~ i.e. •capacity ordinancas,u failed to fi11 
the vacuum in a manner satisfactory ta any of the governmental parties involvect. 
3} and 4) The third and fourth imi,ediments are ccmplex1y related and en-
tail mch more.than the standard eanplaints one would expect to hear from leg-
- . 
Ill 
1slators about bureaucratic 1ner-tia at the Lander level. The proposed HRG had 
- beccme the victim of a three-way tug-of-war. The primary a>ntestants were a) 
the t,alirig SPO/FDP vs. the opposing ·coU/CSU rract1ons in P_arliament; b) short-
term po11t1c1ans vs. life-tenured civil servants; c) the elected foreas of a 
weakening SPO at the federal level vs. the CDU-dominated ~ureucracies in a 
majority of the states. Growing tensions among these three 91"0U1JS were the in-
direct consequenca of the SPD 1s electoral victories at the national level in 
1969 and 1972, which led ta "house-cleaning• at the top and retrenchment at the 
bottcm. _ 
-~I 
. Despite the investiture of f,-amewort powers at the national level, the _ --,. -, 
I ~s:._ .-.-.-- - - • -•· ---'-··----· --. ·.;:.-.:.,1::...:. 
-Lander govemnents, as represented in the Bundesrat, still retained a CQns~1- - -- - --- -1 
tutionally guaranteed veto on a_11 questions pertaining to education and culture; -
- not sur,,r1sirtgly, delegates reacted ta parl1amentaJ"J Framework proposals much 
1o the manner of jealous 1ove!"S. Several state goverranents which had 1n fac:t . 
111orked ta draft higher education acts on their own prior ta the federal push ~..; ----~~=::-___~ 
had produced radically different results, with institutions in Berlin, Hamburg 
and Branen at one end, Munich and Stuttgart at the other, due to c:nntrol by 
opposite parties. P1ayi.ng_ out the role of national Opposition for the fint 
time in almost 25 years. of post-war politics, the CDU/CSU _succeeded in weaken- -
' ' ' 
ing social democratic reforms at crucial points thM:>ughout the. legislative pro-
cess by virtue of continued strength in the Bundesrat •. From 1972 on, the CDU/. 
CSU made ample use of the upper house majority to d1Jute or delete refonn pro-
visions and to add certain 11 law and order" features to the HRG bi11. The out-.. 
come of the 1976 elections fonnalized the party-political deadlock, and ccn--
servative gains at the Lander level sesed ta ref1ect a hostile public reaction 
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to the student movement and the spread of domestic terrorism. The SPD's slim 
margin of victory can be attributed in part to satisfaction with Ostpolitik and 
to Schmidt's skillful management of the national economy. 
The political at:Jnosphere did not bode well for the higher educational sys-
tem. Both- sets of concerns, domestic security and the health of the economy, 
figured heavily in setting the legislative stage for the university refonn bill. 
Even before the BMBW submitted its first official proposal, legislative debates 
over developments in•the tertiary sector left members of parliament with "an 
aftertaste of something controversial, sanething problematic and of question--
able value" (Von Schenck, p. 38). Pessimistic from the start, th·eir political 
dispositions led Gennan parliamentarians to sound the death-knell for university 
autonomy long before they were to succeed in preparing, revising and promulgat-
ing the Framework Law. 
Refonners had employed a variety of strategies, expansion and experimenta-
tion, standardization and rationalization, and still th_e "university problemu 
persisted. Indeed, by 1970 the-higher.educational crisis appeared-to have· 
grown much worse. Technological speci.al ization was becoming the sine qua _.!!Q!!. 
of a stable Gennan economy,.increasing the denands that would be made on the 
higher educational sector. The Sund had sought to expand its framework powers; 
now it would be compelled to use them more extensively, politics permitting. 
The first legislative qraft for a national Higher Education Act presented to 
. . . 
parliament in 1971 provoked strong partisan reaction. -The SPO_version foresaw 
. . 
the introduction of the comprehensive university; nationwide, included provi-
sions for curricular and personnel refonn, and accepted .the principle of in-
-stittitional self-detennination (Mitbestimriung) subject 'to no specific parity 
. . 
regulation. Shortly thereafter, the CCU/CSU presented its own draft. to the 
Bundestag, which contained a radically different approach to university gover- · 
nance and rejected the imposition of the "integrated" comprehensive model as 
the norm governing further expansion efforts. 
In a landmark decision in 1972, the Court found that the Numerus clausus 
system devised to,meliorate the overcrowding of especially popular disciplines 
violated the precepts of Art. 12/1 GS. The Court., in essence. ·challenged fed-
eral laM11akers to develop objective and universally applicable norms for admis-
sion decisions, a prerogati.ve that. had been exercised solely by the university 
in former times. · The justices nonetheless exp~sed thei1" strong preference 
for academic achievement, waiting time and "hardship• criteria, aff1nning the 
selection procedures· informally agreed. upon by the Lander' ministers prior ta 
their interstate compact of Octobm-, 1972. The Court also exhorted the members 
of parliament to devise the means for extending university capacities. In so 
doing, the judiciary established itself as an advocate of university expansion. 
The financial crunch which followed in the wake of the 1973-74 recession 
11ltimately curtailed coninon federal-stats efforts ta expand the higher eciuca- . 
. . . . . . ~ 
tional system any further. Yet ever mare individuals who had ~~n __ de~~ed _ entrJ~_ / 
awing to overcrowding, appealed to the administrative. c:aurt:s on the basis ·a,---,--- . -·-= 
. -~. . . 
theii- ~rt~ 12/1 rights. Court action· served ta expedite Lander reaction, and 
1974 saw another trial effort by the states and the West Gennan Rectors• ~n- . 
ference to design a more reliable system for measuring universiey cai,acit1es 
(Kacazita.tsverordnungen), sines too many of the would-be students were actuatlY--~~;.-~? 
winning .9!. jure contests. 
Unable to implement directly their own strategy for higher educational 
reform, conservative elements joined forces to block the 11denocraticization11 
tactics of the SPO~ On May 29, 1973, the Federal Constitut1onal Court 
tBundesveriassun9s9ericht} passed down a deeision in favor of 398 professors 
·and associates, who opposed the Higher Educational 11Prel iminary Lawll • 
-(Vorschaltsgesetz) in Lower Saxony. The Court ruled that three-way parity in 
/ 
university decision-making organs violated the constitutional rights of the 
senior academic staff members as posited in Art. 5/3 GG. Moreover, the Court 
held that these fu11 professors were to beguarantaed at least one half of the 
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seats 1n any body regulating teaching and examinations (massgebender Einfluss), 
and assured a clear majority (ausschlaggebender Einfluss} in matters of academic 
hiri"ng" firing and research. · Consequently, it was· the Constitutional Court 
· which took the first critical step in standardization of university governance: 
by recognizing in principle the need for representation of a11 groups directly 
affected by academic decisions 1n central university organs, at the same time 
limiting proportionately the amount of influence each of these groups could 
bring to bear on final decisions .according to their level of 11 qual ification. 11 
Bad enough that the legislators were obligated to adhere to a number of proscrip-
tions contained in the Constitutional Court rulings; equally harmful to the con-
cept of university autonomy was the fact that subsequent drafts of the Framework 
Law followed what were essentially political prescriptions appearing in the jus-
ti¢es1 opinions accompanying the decisions. 
From the perspective of university observers, the draft proposal had: 
' ' 
an i11111ediately negative impact, in that the political nature of the debates did 
more to "divide and conqu.er11 proponents of more radical refonn alternatives, 
than it did to promote administrative effectiveness. Worst of all, perhaps, 
was the fact that the HRG not only promised to alter s1,1bstantial1y the structure ~-
of university governance, thereby disregarding the principle of institutional 
self-detennination. It threatened at the same time to leave other critical di-
mensions of university activity, such as curricular refonn.and regulation of 
examination contents, open to the discretion of the Lander, those who had been 
recalcitrant refonners in the first place. 
By 1976, the passage of the Framework Law had become a political end in 
itself~ rather than .a means to a more effective system of higher learning ~.;. a 
classic case of goal displacement, especially on the part of the SPD, under much 
pressure from its own left wing, on the one hand, and CDU/CSU forces, on the 
" . 
other.· Members of the academic conmtUnity in all of the Lander sharply criti-
. cized the process as well as the product of five years of educational-legislative 
activity. In this author's est1mat1on, the pramulgation of _the Hochschul-
-rahmenaeset; _boi1s down to a struggle be'bleen federal and state-level authori• 
ties, a jurisdictional dispute exacarbated by opposing party-political config-
urations· at these two levels and arbitrated by a supposedly non-political ju-
diciary. The HRG became law on January 29, 1976, not because it promised any 
particularly outstanding advantages for the higher educational system, -but be-
-cause po 1i t1 cians - because they are pol 1 t1cians - needed to attend to other 
important business that had been postponed in the struggles over the·HRG. 
E. CONCLUSION: INTEREST GROUP CONFlICT AND AUTONOMY IM AN AGE OF RECONSTRUc-· 
TION -. 
. . . R 
In broad terms, three classes of interests representative of .Bund, Lander. 
and Academe were directed toward the achievement of very diffennt objectives. -
Members of the scientific-scholarly comnunity hoped to pracure funds as expedi• 
. - . - I 
ently as· possible far post-secandary and outside researdr f~ci-1i:ties._ At the ~-- --
1 
same time, they sought to avoid the issue of •comprehensive planning• connected·~:-"?· 
with state budgetary politics _which they believed viola~ the open~cied, in-
exhaustible character of _W1ssenschaft. The Linder w~re primari1y interested 
1n relieving themselves of mounting fiscal 'burdens, while maintaining state 
sovereignty over educational affairs. They were• little concerned with long-___ _ 
. - ~-::-::.-:..--:--=-:;. 
term prospects for scientific research, but focussed instead on soort.-ter,n con-
tingency planning. The Sund anticipated long-term gains in areas where its 
jurisdiction had been constitutiana11y restricted. Certainly, the national 
, . . I . . 
executive worried. in the short-run about its weak international image. But 
. . ' . - . . 
-ccmprehensive planning efforts in the educational s~tor also serv,ed as a means 
to another end, i.e. constitution.al finance reform, effectively increasing the 
federal revenue share in the long-run. Later on, a darkening employment pie- , 
ture and growing concerns· about the genera 1 hea 1th of the soc1 a 1 market system · 
would allow for the emergence of a fourth class of interests in complementary, 
yet~ta be created:refonn conmissicns, namely those of unions-and industries. 
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The academic interests eventually lost out to the "reds 11 (SPD Lander) and. 
"blacks" (CDU/CSU Lander) in the fight over the Bund Is "gold." Administrators 
II 
at both Sund and Lander levels were obliged to consider, but not to act upon a 
growing battery of refonn reco11111endations. In trying to play off one authority 
-
against the ot~er, the university community was soon deprived of its traditional 
autonomy at both ends. Further, as policy-makers came to appreciate the com-
plex nature of problems confronting various educational subsystems, they tended 
to deal extensively with all of them and intensively with none. As complexity 
made certain constitutional revisions absolutely essential, the focus shifted 
from the educational catastrophe.to the overarching problem of fiscal crisis. 
In light of the dramatic changes these developments induced in the policy-
. making envirorunent, Peter Faulstich concludes: 
· It would therefore be incorrect to hold the federalistic structure 
of the Gennan Federal Republic as the main reason for the fa'f.lure o'f 
educational refonn efforts, lest one delude oneself into believing 
that an instututional reorganization would suffice to .right the wrongs. 
and redirect misdevelopments ••• The fact remains that the existing 
political interests --·and power constellations -- stand in the way of 
even this type of reorganization. The jurisdictional dispute between 
the national and state level governments 1s an expression in tenns of 
constitutional law of conflicting [ooliticall interests.among ·educa- . 
tional policy-makers (Faulstich, 1977, p. 149). · 
. . . . n -
Judicial efforts to resolve. conflicts between the Sund and the Lander;· SPD ·· ·--
and CDU factions, politicians and bureaucrats have ·not been without political 
costs. The solutions advanced by the judicial branch are temporary at best; 
· every act of interpretation, every textual exegesis produces new elements of 
law. Each decjsion tends to breed its own brand of conflict in new areas, not 
to mention the manner in which it contributes appreciably to the Court1 s own 
workload. The carved-in-stone character of Constitutional Court rulings means, 
on the one hand, that judicial actors have become the recognizea managers of an 
interdependence which they in part have helped to create. · The other .side of 
the coin is that academic institutions in the Federal Republic have been in-
creasingly deprived of the right to establish primary educational goals and to 
_j 
detennine the best means of achieving those goals, which poses a most signifi-
cant threat to institutional sunival and acadenic freedom in the FRG. The 
Gennan brand of politicized legalism ultimately limits the types of adjustments 
uni.versities wi11 be able to make. should new socia-econcmic contingencies arise. 
This ccnclusion rests fn part on-a number of 1nt_eni.ews conducted with per-. 
sons who were involved f n all phases of the legislative process - actors rang-
ing frm members of ccmpeting part-/ factions to officials at the ministerial 
level, not to mention those most directly affected by the legislative flurry,. 
ttie acadanic emi,loyees. The only comnan reaction voiced by these diverse groups , 
was a high· degree of d1ssatisfac:tion. The HRG, they maintained. was clearly a 
case where a_bad canp1'0111ise was conceivably better than no CQ11Prcm1sa·at all. 
"' . The lawmakers among than openly admitted that van Universitatsautoncmie 1st nie 
die Rede sewesen - university autonomy was never a topic of real discussion. 
Few of the university groups were directly or regularly .consul~~ ~~er_~- _10~:~~"~-=-.] 
· period of time •. Few of· the legislatars were fn .. a position to identify strong·ls,~· · .,._·;:-
. ·witb the concept of universit'J autanomy, since their primary_ cnncern centered 
on short-tenn political accountability. 
The Federal Framework Law for Higher Education in its pnsent form, and 
the spect?'Um of State Adaptation Laws prcmulgated in its wake, do not ap~ear to -·-"·-~= 
·.:.-:-•-- ~ 
offer a more long lasting resc1ut1on of tansians, nor a necessarily durable po-
11t1cal ·consensus on role of higher education and the importance of university 
autonomy in the FRG. Then what has been acmnplished during 15 years of (what 
critics 1 abe 1 ) the 11~form hect, c?" 
In. one respect, the reform·has·taken hold: the expansion programs begun 
in the late sixties have significantly broadened citizen accass to higher edu~ 
cation - if you don't mind the wait, that is. · Waiting periods of three tc 
seven years continue to plague applicants locking for a place in the hardcore 
Numerus .clausus disciplines. The number of students enrolled in the tertiary 
· sector has risen impressively from sane 373;000 in 1965 to 788,000 in 1974.and 
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to more than 978,000 in 1978/79 . {FU-INFO, No. 5/1980). The percentage of a 
given cohort now attending academic_ institutions has also jumped from less than 
six percent in 1965 to ro~ghly twenty percent by 1979 • 
. - i 
Refonners have furthennore brought about a measure of standardization.with 
regard to university administration and degree requirements; but the beauty of 
this important refonn accomplishment appears to be only skin deep.· Substantive 
as well as political differences persist from one state to another. especially 
in relation to the teacher training and recroitment practices which remain un-
. . 
der the control of the Llnder ministers. The HRG did what it was supposed to 
do in a limited sense, !ll.· it provided state-level policy-makers with.a common 
legal framework. But a closer look at the eleven Adaptation Laws leads one to 
conclude that the Framework Law is about as effective in covering up the dif-
ferences in L!nder educational priorities as were the emperor's new clothes in 
protecting the sovereign.from unfavorable environmental elements. The·regula-
t10ns·have·becoine· more and more detailed with· each legal turn; the distinctions 
between qualifications, extrafunctional and otherwise, are more and more acute. -
II . ' . 
Some of the Lander allow:for organs of student government; others, such as 
Bavaria; have outlawed them.· Some states guarantee the legal.maximum in a$sign-.., 
1ng representational seats to non-professorial groups, others hold participa-
I 
tion in· decision-making bodies to minimal levels. Ultimately, ·the standardiza-
tion of academic programs will ~epend upon the cooperative efforts and compromise 
agreements worked out byi the regional cur_ricular refonn commissions, whose mem-
bers have only begun to tackle the· task at hand. The new CCU-government in 
Berlin has already held ;numerous parliamentary hearings on a proposed overhaul 
of the not.;.yet-implemented 1979 Adaptation Law. As late as May, 1982, the state· 
educational ministers had yet to sign accords guaranteeing mutual recognition 
of certain academic deg~ees. 
. ' Rationalization, that is, the attempt to ensure job-relevant training and 





ulum, accslerating the learning process and holding dawn costs. is an objective.· 
that can only be attained through the clever use of mirrors. Polit1cization of 
the university refonn issue has led ta greater external ct>ntrol over the content. 
of higher learning, and assessments by outside agents are increasingly based on 
econanic criteria. Rat1onalizat1on measures may assist political authorities 
in dealing with the. question of 1nst1tut1ona1 efficiency; but moves in this di~ 
rect1on ought not to be equated with educational effectiveness. Succassful ra-
tfona1izat1on wuld signify that tangible benefits have accrued to individuals 
participating in the accelerating learning precess as a direct consequenca of 
legislative refonn activity. Present academic unemployment statistics in the 
Federal Republic belie the benefits of mass education -for mass educatian.•s sake. 
Rationalization, in many-respects, has failed to service refonn objectives.; 
It is highly unlikely that officials in the Federal ·Republic w111 jump at 
the chance to engage in a process of a,-o111ng refonns. 11 What German poHtician_ 
- - - -.··--· - - • - ' •··•r•'·-'---~~ 
. . 
would.be willing to reopen this legislative Pandora's box· on a regularized ba-
sis?· My suspicion is that the academic institutions themselves would wind up 
worse for the wear and tear, as each succassive package of regulations is mere 
bureaucratically· and legally binding than the one that went before. Appeals to . ' 
' ' ' 
· the judiciary in matters of higher educational politics have beccme more· or less--~e:-c-e"? 
standard operating procedure in the Gennan Federal Republic,. but juridical~ 
sponses per!!. do_ not guarantee that cooperation and coordination will ensue 
among ,ccmpeting partisan· groups. The "university problem11 is in fact symptcmat."l~-c=---
of more fundamen~l social and political cleavages. At the basis of the "educa- . l 
t1ona1 catastrophe11 was a recognit1on that advanced ·1ndustr1al Gennany has be-
come a very canplex, interdependent society whose problems require collective 
solutions. Whether the Bund or the Lander ought to dcminate the educational pol-
. icy process is no longer the issue. The real question is· to what degree politics· 
' ' 
seeks to or ought to take ccnanand in refonning institutions whose very raison 
d'etn! lies in the generation of scientific expertise and academic knew-hew, 
u~n which a healthy national econcmy ultimatsly depends. 
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